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SALES AND INVESTMENT:

BEHAVIOR OP MANUFACTURERS
1949-1957

I
Presented to the Department
Oberlin College,
December 16, 1960

of Economics

by

James G. Scoville

I

Since the appearence of Keynes' General Theory the major point of
macro-economic emphasis has been upon the conditions and inducements

necessary for capital investment. The general view on the dynamic processes of the economy has been largely altered in this past quarter cen-

tury.

No longer do we believe that what is saved automatically finds its

way into investment, with total demand---and, hence, income---remaining
constant.

The Great Depression

the development of fairly decent time

series, and the often biting words of Keynes have given business cycle
theory a new outlook and a new direction.
all these facts in this short paper

J do not propose

to discuss

the consideration of the classical

views and the examination of the ideas of Keynes and his s11ccessors can
~ell be left to the reader.

Instead, our attentinn shall be focussed on

or

a very limited aspect of the problem

capital investment, namely, the

plant and equipment ex,ienditures of manufacturers during a short period
of time.

An

attempt will be made to go beyond the simple statistical

analysis to discover other factors operatlve in this period, and their

possible

effects upon our results.

I

The figures and series used in this paper are largely the product
of the Office of Business Economics

Department of Commerce,

from the "Survey of Current Business" and its Supplements.
to obtain these statistics are varied

and are taken
The means used

and sometimes not entirely reputable

Those employed the most in this paper are estimates of manufacturers' plant
and equipment expenditures and sales, the realized figures and the anticipations for both these catagories, as given at the beginning of each year.

-2f figures are usually reported in either the March or April "Survey."

These

The limitations of these data should be understood before they are put
to use; indeed, the weakness

are legion.

The original figures are ob-

tained by written reports from various manufacturers, which reports are made
voluntarily except for approximately one thousand large corporations re-

quired to report to the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Among the smaller

firms, the tendency is not to re,-,ort if they have spent nothing---this has

led to a sample which is stratified in a distinctly top-heavy manner, although corrections have been made for this.

Furthermore, it is hardly an

exaggeration to conclude that no two persons who fill out the questionnaire
have the same idea of the information desired • . For the purposes of this
paper, however, the most disturbing matter is that the Department of Com-

merce is not concerned with what manufacturers actually expect, but with
predicting what will really happen.

Therefore, there is a constant juggling

of the figures on the basis of past experience, which makes their data of
more value as forecasts, but which represents a caveat to the writer of this
paper.

Anticipations are reported

in the "Survey" with such precise ex-

oressions as: 'somewat over eight percent,• 'about four percent,' and so
on.

The anticipations figures which I have used are calculated on the basis

of the most reasonable reading of sucl; statements.

On

the assets side of the balance sheet, there are several factors

which recomment
be used, which

these data.

Only aggregate figures for manufacturing

shall

gives us the hope that the errors of the constituent cate-

gor ies will have cancelled one another.

A fact that betokens the absence

of some possible 'corrections' is that tbese figures are not made t o f it i nto

-3-

the breakdown of investment civen in the gross national product accounts.
Although it must

be said that the most appealing feature

of these statis-

t i cs is their availability, they should be sound enough if used cautiously.

II

It is a simple theoretica1

connection between consumption, invest-

ment, and the "mul tiplier" which demonstrates the power of changes in

investment over the whole economic system.

'!hereafter. the basic problem

has continually presented itself: what are the reasons for fluctuations in

the level of investment? In this paper, we shall primarily be looking at
that which Keynes called the "principle of effective demand," as it is involved with the manufacturing sector in the years 1949-19S7.

I

It must be

remembered that there is not an automatic and mechanical link between
changes in the effective demand (as represented by the sales of the firms

involved) and the decision to invest.

The final decision probably rests

on a much more poorlydefined concept,

that of "expectations," upon which

sales behavior should have an impact.

At times in the statistical develop-

ment of the argument, it may seem

that emphasis is being laid only upon

the factor of demand, but, hopefully,
their due at a later point.

other considerations will receive

It should be observed that the two categories

denoted above, demand and expectations, cannot be strictly separate areas
of consideration, even in the statistical

sections.

Although the data

employed are in constant dollars, which eliminates some of. the effects of
price changes

of product and capital

nate the effects
segregation

goods,

of anticipated changes.

it certainly would not elimi-

There can be no through-going

between demand and expectations.

-4For the most part, the data used cover the period 1949-1957, al-

though there are some exceptions

The price figures employed to reduce

sales and expenditures to constant dollars were obtained from the

recent source,

u. s.

Income

cut-off date of 1957.

and
Output,

most

1
Out
95
'This
8 is the reason for the

'lbe price figures for plant and equipment of Wooden

and Wasson (presented in the November

1956 "Survey") were not used as

they covered even a shorter period and were, in general, close to the

figures for producers' durable equipment.

Some series presented begin in

19S0• as figures from 1949 were needed to determine various values (as in

the discussion of tile derivation of anticipations).
this study (1949) is rather arbitrary, but it

was

The starting date for

felt wise not to push

the cover age further back: the referenccs in the "Survey" become even more
vague, there were certain conwlsions in the population
shortly before the period covered, and thus

,oie

avoid

most

of the sample
of the immediate

effects of the war.

At this time, a brief explanation of the symbols employed may •,rove
of value to the reader.

The letters I and S shall refer to plant

mcnt expenditures and sales, respectively.

and equip-

Whenstanding alone, they will

denote realized quantities
tics, the subScriy,t referring to the year.

When these

letters are adjoined by a star (*) • they will refer to anticipated quantities.

The letter F will sometimes be used to designate a computed quan-

tity or a large collection of symbols.

To dispel any fears. I will assure

the reader that the mathematics in this paper will be simple and largely
concealed in the body of the work •

.Another point must be made: this paper does not attempt to present a
model describing the operations of the manufacturing sector during tl1e years

-s1949-1957,

into which one cnn plug the data and receive the proper answer

The statistical work is only an attempt to deduce various propositions

concerning the behavior of manufacturing witlt regard to capital investment.

Nor does this paper attempt to explainor depict the course of ac-

tion of any particular firm under given conditions; its conclusions apply
only to the collective actions of manufacturers

III

Wemight assume that manufacturers as a group

vestment programs

would have their in-

(''investment" is used, unless specifically stated other-

,ri.se, to mean "gross investment") closely tied to their sales. as the
denand operative upon them affects directly the amount they produce

If

demand increases, and inventories are to remain the same, then investment
should increase sufficiently to meet the rise in demand. and there should
be a reverse effect if (demand falls
and order considerations,

relation which

we

Nevertheless, in view of inventory

might not have expectedthe extremely close

we find in the data.

Expressed in billions 0£ constant

(1954) dollars,1 the linear regression tor the years 1949-1957 (see figure
1 on page 6) can be expressed thus :

In= .638S., - 3.4 •
While it is not correct to place heavy emphasis on a generalized regression
.
fi figuresuch as this

. - I ""'-~•4'-'

"'1:l""' coecoefficient
. very
the sample corralation
correlation
1ci ent ( .944 ) 1s

sicnif icant---vle should expect such a result by chance about one time in

a. million.

'lllus, our first proposition must be that in this period manu-

facturers achieved a firm relationship between annual investment and
sales. sale
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Figure 1.

Investment and Sales in 1954 Dollars.
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Pigure 2.

Anticipated Investment and Sal.es in 1954 Dollars.

28

-7In regard to anticipated investment and anticipated sales, the same
type of relationship bolds true.

constant dollars

For the same period, in billions of

the relationship states that:

*•

ID

o736SD* - S.6

(cf. figure 2, page 6)

0

Again the sample correlation coefficient (.816) is significantly high for

thirteen degrees of freedom_ with approximately the previous probability

of chance occurrence, so

we

deduce proposition two; during this neriod,

manufacturers anticipated a firm relationship between

annual investment

and sales.

IV

Several matters come to mind from an inspection of these relationships,

all of which have implications for exonomic theory.

In the first

place, we notice that these equations are not the same -- that is to say,
the relation of sales to investment and the relation of acticipated

to anticipated investment are not _described by the same line.

sales

If sales

should have turned out as anticipated, then investment would have differed

from the anticip[ated fi~ure,

'lhe difference of relationships implies that,

whatever happened, some part of the plans of manufacturers could not be
borne out in the resulatant
tant year.

3

The direct consequence of this

is a

corollary that, as it existed during this period, the manuf acturincr sec-

tor of the economy was inherently unstable in

view of the relation be-

betweeninvestment and sales uniformly achieved,

the anticipated relation-

shio had to fail.

Perhaps we c:an discover the reason for this by a closer

look at the relationships themselves.

In general, the level of antici-

pated investment was more closely tied to anticipated sales than was in-

-sinvestmentt ied to sales.

'!his is reflected in the fact that tlle coeffi-

cient is lari;cr in tb.e former relation •• 736 versus .638.

This differ-

"

ence means that above a certain level of sales (about twenty-two billion
constant dollars), the amount anticipated would

exceed the actual investment

ment, and below this level anticipations would be less than what resulted.
The key to the so1ution of this presumptuous paradox
what we are calling here investment

includese xpenditures for replacement

_is the fact that

is really gross investment---it in-

as well as expantion

Thus, it would

seem that above the $22 billion level of sales manufacturers have faultily

estimated their expenditures by tying them too closely to sales; they have
tended to prorate above the level where expanion began on the basis of

tl:eir replacement expenditures
per dollar of sales below that level.

Below

this level, they perhaps assumed that they would cut back expenditures at
the same rate as they would have increased them in expanion

that the major part of their expenditures

forgetting

would be for replacement

If

this were the case, then we would expectthat manufacturers would have
followed this course of action: to anticipate less investment below a certain level of sales than that which would be justified in the light of

figure 1, and to "ovcr-anticipate" above this level.

The following table

indicates the results of this assumption

Year

sn*

I *

1949
1950

19.4
18.9

8.7
1.1

9.0
8.6

1951
1952

23.3
23.1

13.4
12.s

11.4

Conment

P (I which wou1d
be justified on
the basis of Sn*)
(Dillions of 1954 dollars)

n

11.3

As

these sales figures are below

the $22 billion level, we should
have expected P greater than In*.

canvcrse11, ,~ should have exl)eeted 1n greater than P.

-9Year

sD*

1n*

1953
19S4

12.3

19S5

24.7
23.9
24.S

10.1

12.2

19S6

27,3

14.0

1957

28.0

14.6
15.0

'

Comment

12.3

11.s

As sales were above the $22 billion
level• ,re might have exr,ected that
1n* would ~ greater than P, but the
feverse "'as true. l>erhans in 1953
and 1954 investment was antici,,ated
at less than the long-term proper
amount
in order to reduce the excess capacity aquired dur:i.ng the
Korean War, In 195S, where the only
large deviation occurred, it perhaps
reflectsthe intention to fill part
of 8iJ. by a continuation of the in-

11.8

ventory disinvestment begun in 1954.

The result again conforms to our
hypothesis, as in 1_9S1 and 1952.

14.4

It should be noted that the table shows agreement with the tbeoretical

interpretation of the relationships

in six of nine years covered, and a

borderline case in 1953, with disagreement arising only in the years 1954

and 19S5.

The three troublesome years occur when the Korean war was ended

(or about to be ended:

we

remember

that one of Eisenhower's

pledges in 1952

was to end that war), which undoubtedly would have a dampering effect on

expectations

This and the subsequent "readjustment"--as

euphemize nowadays should

we

are 1·ront to

----

have led us a !ll'iori to expect any variations

to have occurred in this period.

Thus, from the propositions brought forward in section III, concerning

the relation of investment to sales anticipated and that achieved, an attempt bas been made to present a theoretical explanation
between the two equations.

of tl~e difference

It has also been indicated tl1at we may see in

the proposed explanation a reason for the inherent instability which arises
from the difference between the two relationships
that manufacturers anticipated

This explanation

i4

eo 8

either more or less than they would really

need (as measured by past presumably satisfactory, achievement on the

basis of faulty extrapolations. is based on an assumption that manufac-

turers have poor methods

of estimating ·future ea~i tal needs.

'lllis

we

might readily deduce f'rom o. quick glance at figure 2, where we see that

the anticipated figures are more dispersed than the corresponding points
in figure 1; the guesses of future requirements were more varied than the

In a study of 17S large stockmarket firms

actual requirements themselves

Brockie and Grey found that ''methods of investment programming are still

fairly crude in most firms, with programs being closely dependentupon
(a) judgement and (b) performance in the present and immediate past,...4
If such a judgement can be levied against a fairly select group of large
firms

how

much more crude
may be the methods of smaller fims•--the type

,-,redominant in the ''Survey" sam·~C! !

V

Having observed a probable

source of error in the anticipations 0£

•anufacturers, it is time to take a longer look at the possible derivation
of these anticit,ations.

In tbe f.irst case, let us consider the estimation

of anticipated sales for on what is sa!d · here will be based st\t!!e: subsequent assumptions

Weassume that the sales of the present year are a

substantial factor, and that these figures are known by manufacturers
during the time when they anticir,ate the amounts for tl1e next year.

manuafacuers would extrapolate

1Ience,

on the basis of this year's esults in

order to anticipate next year's sales.

A means for understanding the ex-

tra'"'<>lation to be presentedis found in a loose interpretation of the
difference between long-term and sbort-tem expectations
assumed that lone-term expectations

It will be

are r;ovcmed by a comparison of this

year's sales with those of last year, while short-term expectiations are

-11-

affected simply by this. year's results in comparision with what was ananticipated Thus we h•ve two distinct ~·rates of growth:" Sn/Sn-1, governing

erning loncr-term anticipations,. Str-n
~*,applying
both of these are to operate upon

5n

to tile short term,

and

to yield the anticipated sales,

It is natural to expect the operation of either rate singly upon
Sn to be of a multiplicative nature, and it is assumed that the tworates
This latter process finds its justifi-

operate similarly upon one another.

cation in Ca) its simplicity

is not proper to describe the crude process

cess of anticipations outlined in section IV by means of complex equations
and (b) it

is reasonable to presume that short-term expectationsshould

interact with those for the long term.

is the expectation that Sn+l*

The result of all these assumptions
Sn •

.
vsn-1
• 5n1sn*,

*

or that sn+l .0(.

5n3ISn-iSn• •

o<

Por the period covering

anticipated sales from 1950 to 1959, this relation is found:

*

...sw,3

5n+l • .S87~l5nw + 10.1 · •

The correlation coefficient for the sample

5

(. ?12) is significantly high

for the number of degrees of freedom (15) involved.

This does not r.1ean that

the aboveassumptions are "true," but rather tltat they give a fairly close
description

of the situation, which implies that the assumptions are at

least tenable.

It is this last statement toward which this analysis was

directed• to affirm the reasonableness of the assumptions

before proceeding

further.

Having determined that the preceding assumptions

are at least not

unreasonable, we shall now anply them to the question of anticipated investment.

With the propositions !'resented in section III as background,

'

f'

-12we should feel fairly safe in applying tl1e "t\,ro-fold rate of growth
sales argued above to the question of capital programs

presume that
that

Thus

we

of

should

in some amount. plans will be affected by a term stating

1n +l *,l')( 5n 2In/Sn-1Sn~ •

The only change from the previous formulation

has been the introduction of the In term in place of the third

Sn•

This

is not entirely necessary for, as we have seen in section IIJ, there was

a direct relationship between sales and expenditures both realized and
anticipated.

the

1n

'Die forthcoming relationship could have been set up without
tbout

term, but for the sake of mathematical simplicity and for a closer

approximation to the decision-makers• methods

which most
likely include

investment of the present year as a factor, the form has been altered.

We now introduce another assumption,

one which is hardly disputable

view of the volumes written about :lt and the theories founded thereon.
variant of the

overinvestment

must

A

hypothesis shall be included as a factor

involved in the planning
of ca"'.i ta.1 investment.
sectiori JV, the, e

in

As has been discussed in

arise a discrepancy between the actual result and the

antici?,ated sales or eX"IE!nd!tures or both.

An adjustment shall

therefore

be included for the difference between actual plant and equipment expendi-

tures for a civen year.- ana that which tlie year's sates results t10uld presumably
sunably have justified on tl1e basis of anticipations

If• for any year,

manufacturers had in mind a. figure for capital investment (tlle anticipated

figure)

which they felt would be justified at the anticipated level of sales.

then

should expect them to have a feeling of either overinvestment

we

underinvestment

or

.. depending on the relation of actual sales and cx-iencli-

tures to the fomer anticipations.

All this verbal confusion can be conveniently

veniently summarized in a sill!1lle symbolic expression £or the adjustment we

-13should expect them to make:

Discrepancy Adjustment
• [:r,,

J.

- ~ 11,*

6

This adjustment would be subtracted from tbe f figure obtained by simple

investment/sales relation-predictions

expressing the final derivation

in the form:

A linear regression for the period

1950-1959 expressedin billions of

current dollars. gives this expression where P stands for the whole right
side of the above proportion

(cf. figure 3• below

1n_+l* • • 769P + 2.8

..

•

1n*

17
.

· 51

16
..

1S

14

•

,58

13
s~.:

12·

. Sa

51:

., 5.A

11·

10
9
8

.. #,.
,. so

1
6,
j

s

I
3

.. r.--;r--t-·-t--~t--.11.I--o---r--•--1--l--,.-;.-.-+-.!n-l
4 , 5

6 ..

1

8 · 9 . 10

11

12

13 14

Pigure 3.,

Anticipated Investment and the proposed function.

1S

16

17

-14This is a pleasing result for two reasons, the first of which is

that the sample correlation coefficient (0865) is highly significant for
this number of degreesof freedom ClS).

In the second place, the coefficient

cient of the variable Pis much higher than in the former relation concerning

sales (.?69 versus .587). This means that the values of the independent variable CP here,

sn3/Sn_1sn* in the former case) are much more

decisive in determining the values of the result In+i*• than in determining

*.

Sn+l

This may imply that the investment anticipation relationship

is closer to tlie true process of anticipations determination thanwas the
relatively more mechanical model concerning sales.

This section may be summarized by presenting a proposition
during this period

that,

investment, after an allowance for adjustment con-

sidering the previous year's experience, was planned largely on the basis
of anticipated sales.

We have seen that a mechanical interpretation of

the interaction between long-run and short-run expectations has succeeded
as

an

assumption, as it has produced relationships which amply describe

the data on anticipated sales and investment.

VI

The most striking result of the f oregoinc sections is the fact that

investment anticipations and realizations

can,

in general·, be satisfactori-

ly described in terms of past and present sales.

The factor of inventory

change has not been included as either a stimulant or a depressant on antiand we have arrived at a general picture in which this factor

does not semm to be necessary.

'Ibis is not to assert that inventories are

-15not or were not a real factor in business 111:>vement-Metzler has built up

a theory of short-term fluctuations founded on changes in inventories--but that. at first sigbt, it seems stragne to be able to describe this
period 1•.ithout specific reference to them.

However, a second inspection indicates that in those years t1hen inbore a fairly regular relation to the level of sales,

ventory accumulation

inventory anticipations were already hidden in the figures for the relationship
between anticipated investment and sales.

'1he point is macie most

clenrly by looking at the years in figure 2 ,tich are not virtually u~on
the regression line.

19S1 and 1952 stand out as years in ,-ilich antici-

pated expemditures \'Jere higher than

we

should have exriectecl from tlle general

performance, with 19S5 and (to a lesser 'degree") 1950 showing
verse relationsbip.
preceded
by years of

rose

the re-

Doth of the former years are those \·1hich were pre-

high accumulation of inventories: in 1950 inventories

by $5.5 billion

(19.0'£). in 1951 by

~.s

billion (24.6~).

on

the

other hand, 1950 and 1955 were preceded by years <?f inventory disinvestment
ment: -$2.8 billion (-8.8%) in 19491 and -~2.4 billion (-5.2$) in 19S4.
'lhe anticipated expenditures for 1957 show no difference from tlte long-

run regression even though ;nventories rose $5.9 billion (12.7%) in 1956.

The implication of all this is that if the inventory expansion might
be expected
to continue (sales in both 1950 and 1951 having exceeded

amounts anticipated

then manufacturers

than they would have, based

on

the

planned to spend more on capital

oure sales expectations.

1956 sales did

not meet expectations. therefore greater than normal inventory accumulation

was not planned for 1957, and hence the point for 1957 appears near the
regression line.

Similarly, concerning expected outlays for 1950 and 1955

-16-

.

the inventory disinvestment of 1949 and 1954 coupled witit tlle fact that
sales declined more than anticipated perha"8 led manufacturers to expect
a further decline in inventories and• hence. less investment than would
normally have been planned.

'lhis explanation does not conflict with the

traditional theory of the effects of the changes jn invent<.'.!ries on in,..
vestment. and is al)t)arently only a develor,ment of the notion of a "(ixectn
sales/inventories ratio.

H0t1ever, as a matter of fact there is little

direct conf'rontation between the two ex,:,lanations: Metzler's theory is

based on a sudden• unexnected change in inventories and its immediate ef-

fect on plans. 'lhe above exn.lanation covers longer periods of time in
which the guestion of lags other than one year (as is general throughout
this !)a~r) has disappeared, and plans are made on the basis of trends

\1hicll manufacturers may or may not .'1ish to continue.

Basing tllis reason-

inc about the deviations from the lone-term trend of figure 2 on inven-

tories seem$ to

be

reasonable, as deviations occurred only for tllose years

before ·,·.4iich tllere bad been a sh~!'> chance in the trend of inventorieso

VII

It is QJ!Pa.rent at a glance that an attel'lpt to exnlain the deviations

about the trend of £icure 1 \'lill have to include more factors t11an inventory change.

'lhe deviations are smaller, but there are many more of them

al though the trend is more

1

eprescntati ve of the data tlUUt in figure 2,

the correlation coefficient being .944 bere and .016 in figure 2).

It

uill be less confusini; to present if tlle matter is eon~idercd not by sections devQted t<? the a!ll)lic,tion of a ~Ql'ticular factor to each ye!lr, but
by bringing forward the possible factors, year by

year. Less attention

will be paid to specific relations here. as the deviations are quite small •

•

-17-

l do not choose to split hairs over small variations based on data of
questionable orecision--instead, a general view of the l)Ossible modifying factors will

be

')resented.

1949---The variation was negligible.
1950---The

fact that investment was below the amount expected from

the long-run relation was not due to purely economic
to the outbreak of the Korean war.

Af!.

factors, but rather

a result I sales rose very shar.,ly,

but there was apparently not enough of the year ief t to show the reaction
of investment.

1951-1952---Investment was· higher than the long-term relation, probably in major nart due to the continuance of the war I and in ·an attempt

to compensate for the "Underinvestment" of 1950.
1953---'The variation was negligible: despite a substantial drop in
unfilled orders. new orders remained steady, and actual sales were almost
indentical with those antipated
1954-- Capital outlays were below the amount expected for the level

of sales, but part of the sale~ were filled by inventory disinvestment.

This exercised a depressing

influence on the level of expenditures

were declining, unfilled orders still falling.

as sales

A situation of excess capacity

city had developed after the relatively hich investment years of 19S1 and

19S2.

1955---Manufacturers were hesitant in emerging from the recession,
raising their outlays only slightly in the face of increased Sales, new
orders and backlog..

A J)artial cause of their caution may have been the

fact that the prices of their sales had risen by 2.6!t since 1953, but the
price level of producers durables had increased by 3.6S.

-181956-1957--The continued boom in 1956 drew more than normal exexpenditures
t o compensate for the low le11e1 of 19S5, and in both years

to assist the building un of inventories.

Sales prices increased very

sharply in these two years (7.3%), the sharpest rise during this period
1949-1957 • which -r,resumably would have provided an inducement to invest

vest, even though prices of producers

durables continued their upward

march.

'VIII

In figme 1, investment was related to sales; in figure 2, anticianticipated
investment was related to anticipated sales.
anticipated investment
the result

t·1as

\ie

v,

related to an adjusted rate of. growth of sales,

of which was seen in figure 3.

employed in section VI,

'Dien in section

Using much the

same

method as

shall now investigate the variations about the

trend found in this latter correlation.

Considering the a priori nature

of the assumntions made in section V, small variations are of even less
significance as the basis fo,: such a relation is not as obvious as for
It is more obvious to ~. assume
a direct relationship be(A
<. '4'-betweencapital outlays and sales (eitller actual or anticipated
than to

figures 1 and 2.

{!;-

~~4/

assume that a fairly arbitrary mathematical model describes the actual

process of' decision.
other

factors

Hence, in an attempt to evaluate the influence of

only large variations from the regression line will be

considered.

As

figure 3 is drawn in current dollars, it \1li.ght be apparent

that

some of the variations fran the trend wJll be due tn nr!ce movements.
'!bus, for exanmle, in 1949 the prices of capital goods rose 5'51 but prices

-19of sales dropped 2$;

as

we

should suppose

this combination was not

conducive to capital anticipation 19S0 appears below the trend line.
similar reasoning applies to 1954 anticipations based on a rise of

capital prices greater than the rise of sales prices in 1953.

Never-

the less andattempt to explain the variations op the basis of price
changes alone must fail; an orderly pattern of the type just indicated

simply does not appear

1957 anticipations are above the regression

line, although producers durables rose in price by 6% in 1956, while
sales prices rose only

4½$.

This does not deny that prices had an

effect, but rather implies that the effects were not orderly nor probably large:

we

should seek the major reasons elsewhere

A similar

argument .could be presented to justify the emission from consideration

or

that neo-elassical keystone, interest rates

I will sumply note

that Juesenberry has found little effect of interest rates (once one
i;ets the matter quantified) on investment, due in part to the much lar-

larger
factor of taxes on profits. 7

It may be observed that the years 1951 and 1956 are above

the trend

line in figure 3, whereas the preceding years 1950 and 1955 were below

the ti end denicted in figure
figure1.

'lhis would imply

that attempts were

being made to counteract the relatively low .investment of the preceding
years.

Similarly, the anticipations for 1952 and 1958 are below the

regression

perhaps in attempts to remedy the "overinvestment" occur-

ring in 19S1 and 1957.

Futhermore,

with the exception of 1952, the

same inventory argument advanced in section VI seems to be applicab!e.

If it had been justified in the minds of manufactuers

to continue a

process of rapid accumulation, then we should expectinvestment anticianticipations
to be inordinately high, and lower if a continued jnventory

-20disinvestment might be expected.

Thus the general conclusion of this section (applying also to
sections VI and VII) is that, in the period 1949-1957, manufacturers'

investment-sales relations followed fairly defined patterns.

Deviations

around these trends can largely be attributed to themovements of inventories and orders, with a consideration of the effects of the Korean War.
The factors of smaller movement (prices and interest rates) seem to have

had no measurable effects, and were overshadowed by larger and more i:,ower-

ful factors.

IX

'!here is, however, little evidence to sup'lOrt tlle
theory that expectations are self-fulfilling.
'lhe view of the future held by important decision
makers only partly influences their decisions. And
their decisions only partly determine the outcome. Many
things happen that nobody decides, wants, or expects
---v. Lewis Bassie

Ileretofore, the discussion has dweltt upon first the relation of investment

to sales, then that of anticipated
sales.

investment to anticipated

We have noted that the difference between the two relationsb.ips

was sufficient to guarantee a difference between expectationsand realirealizations
t-ntat, we should now like to know occurred when sales differed
from their antici.,ated level? At thi.s point we might hone to gain an in-

sight into the dynamics of manufacturers reactions to the real course of

events.

-21A regression was derived for tlle r,eriod 1949-1957 (see ficure 4.

below) ,..llich s_ave this relation (ill constant dollars):

In

= .r.741n·,~~}
,_

+ 1.4

•

~11.-,.d.Ji

''114-/
5-"J
'!he aample }aegrce••• coefflcient was am-,roximately 1.0. a very unlikely

occurr-:ace by pure chance at 13 de~rees of freedom. 'lbe fact that this
hypothesis is ret,resentatiw of the data can easily been seen from figure
4.

Only the point for the year 1951 is relatively distant from the re-

gxession line, and this
deviation we must attri-

bute to the supply situation \'l.tich developed as

a result of the outbreak
of war. 9

15i

141

::j

;. s1

11 '

ow= faith in

this relation is further

10

substantiated when a simi-

9

lar relationshiy,, ex-

-~-'~ 49
8 ~-... . -~
I
8
9 . 10·

~essed in c:urrent·do11ars
is offered as evidence: its

1~

1•2

Pigure 4.
atanges of investment and
sales versus antici~ations.

sarrmle correlation coeffi•
cient was .961 at 17 degrees of freedom.

'l'his relationship is tile link

bet\\leen the two equations presented in. section III, and relates them to
the· variations from c:xr.,ectations encountered in eaclt year.

It contains

further evidence for the $22 billion ''median° level of sales mentioned

frequently before.

If sales turn out as expected (i.e., Su/Sn*= 1), then

~nvestment will be greater than anticipated below sales of $22 billion 0
and less than anticipated above that level.

'!he general hypothesis of

-22-

this paper, that-investment in manufacturing was i,rincii,ally based on
effective demand, is strongly supported by this relationship, exclucHng

as it does all other factors.

we conclude that manufacturers res.,ondecl

Q~icldy (within the smne year) to the develc,iments of the year in pro-

gress, and their 1:eactions ~re based upon a comparison between actual
davclopments and anticipations recnrdinc sales.

Priend and Bronfenbrenner, in their survey study, came to the opr,osite conclusion about the effect of sales on ca"ital outlays. 10

'Ibey

surveyed 30S large fims 1•il\ose 194~ er,enditures had differed from anticipations by twenty-five ~rccnt or more, and found a strong nositiw

correlation only for those firms which specified sales as the major factor involved in the.change.

Nevertheless, almost all of the factors

\'lhicll tlley ent111.erated involved an outlook on sules: certainly a firm.•s

sales experience affects its desire to switch to newer eguipnent or its
or,inion of the ca-,ital gooc1s ma,rket. 'Iheir stucly can actually ba.ve little
.
.

connection with tllis pa!,"Cr--the!r studv covered only a Sl!lall select sr,)Up
of firms.

A firm \·:llich deviated tuenty-five percent from its ant.icinations

could \tell find other reasons than sales to specify. without denyillf; their
effect.

'!his t,a,")(!r has looked only at the aggregnte behavior of the

group, and must consider the opinions of individual manufacturers as
merely "interesting."

X

In this thesis. manufacturing has largely been dealt with as an

atomistic, se1£-cont11ined unit within the economy. 'lhis is, of course,
an extreme oversimplification: demand changes from the rest of the

economy have an effect on the level of demand within the manufacturing
sector.

Manufacturers produce the major part of all the plant and equipment

ment covered by the data, excluding taxes and non-materials costs included

in

the value

of pl.ant and equipment. Expecting to find some evidence of

an "acceleration principle

a regression betweensales and investment

(t11e converse of that done in section III) lias the form
Sn= 1.161n + 10.1

0

and a·significant sample correlation coefficient of .785.

Expressed in

English, manufacturers• sales consisted of approximately the amount
by the group for investment plus a constant $10.1 billion.

spent

It is inter-

esting to note that the sum of the constant and the average level of investment ($11.s billion) aporoximates the $22 billion level of sales which
has played such a large part in the previous considerations.

Without a ·

lengthy and involved analysis, it is sufficient to observe that the division 0£ sales between durable and non-durable goods gen~.rally follows tile
proportions indicated by the regression.
vestment. would be less than

goods sales 11 while

we should bave exr,ected that in-

but nearly a. constant proportion of, durable

sales of non-durables should approximate the constant,

being largely sales to the rest of the economy

Further breakdowns

both

by durable versus non-durable goods manufacturers and by size of firm,
\·!ould shed even more light upon the intcmal processes of the manuf'acturmanufacturing
sector
Such examinations will, however
theses, when more

be left to future writers of

data will hopefully be available.

The above considerations, giving a general idea of the internal

relations of the manufacturing sector, combine wjth the previous dis-

cussions of the relationships between investment and effective demand to

-24further demonstrate the potency of tile demand factor.

As we have seen.

investment (both realized and anticipated) is closely related to tlle

level of (actual or anticipated) sales. Manufacturers, subject to the
provisos of section I

seem to adjust their investment levels to the

developments of the year in progress

Capital outlays for the succeeding

year can be interpreted to include an adjustment for "over-" or· "underinvestment" based on the present year's performance.

The acceleration in-

involvedin the fact that that which is one firm'sinvestment is another

firm's sales concludes our investigation of the hypothesis of ••effective
demand." Subsidiary factors and non-economic developments can account

for the deviations about tlle regressions. but the main point is clearin this period

manufacturers• investment behavior was dependent upon

the level and changes of demand~

*****
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NO'll3S

1 •. .Adjusted on the basis of indices found in u. s. Incane !!!2. Output,
19S8: investment by tlte price level of r,roducers' durable goods and sales
by tbe level of prices of all ,molesale commodities excludinc food.

2 • .Adjusted by the same indices as in note 1 1 but using the prices of

the year in ,·.lhich the anticipations were made to deflate them.

. Sn and Sn* were equal at 22.
3. 'Ihat is, unless by chance
4o M. D. Brockie and A. L. Grey, Jr., "'Ille Marg;na1 Bfficiency of Ca"'ital
and Investment '!'rogr8Dllling," ''Bconomic Journal," necember 19S6, p. 67S.

s.

Expressed in current dollars, in order not to exclude possible inter-

action between changes in price levels.
6. If this adjustment 1.~ere set up with t'lore sophistication, as \'Je earlier
noted that manufacturers anticipated faulty relations between investment
and sales, the subsequent relationship might even provic;ie a closer fit to
tlle data.
1. J~es s. .iJuesenberry, Business 9:c1es
Ilill, New York, 1958), pp. 49ff.

8.

!!!2. Economic

Grol'. th• Ot:Graw-

Na'i:ional Dureau of .Bconomic 1~escarch, I~cent ~velQJ2!!:!!ts
C?lew York, 195S), PP• 10•11.

!:!! Poreca.sting,

,!!! Short-

9. See the''Survey of' current Dusiness," Pebruary· 1952, esl)Ccial.ly its
review of the year 19511 and also tlie"Survey0 for 5e">teMber 19S1, pp. 5-7.
10. Friend and Dronfenbrenner 1 "Plant and f.:.quinment l'rocrams 1 " in l.ecent
Develo,:wmts !!!, Sbort-'Ierm Bconomic Forecasts,, NllER•

•
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APPENDIX I
CRITJCAL VALUES OP n-tn OO~RBLAT:~ON O1BPP!CJBN'l'

.OS 'Prc-bability

De[.·rees of Preedom

12
13

.5&

14

.497

15

.482

.CJl

.tot
.<,41

.S14

16
17
18

.623
.606

.• 468
.456

.soo

.444

.561

.S75

Courtesy of P::ofessor Wade Bllis.
~WLATIONSIIIPS P~llSnN'l'llD JN n,IS PAPJ:l.'1,
Wl'll1 T1mI:'!. DBr:BBS OP P;'Jl!ll>OM, .riND
SAM"LB co:rnBLATION COBPPl~JllNTS (r),.
T *' • • 736 Sn* -n

Sn+t*

s.6

= .S87(5n3/Sn-lSn* )

,. d. f •
1~

r

13 d.f.

r = .944

+ 10.1

15 d.f,.
1n+1*

s

•

2
769f8u !ta

• - {In- ?.In*,,
8

ISn-1Sn

n

-

In

= .874

1n*(5n/5n* )

•

.930

J

15 d 0 f.'.

r = .112
+ 2.8
r= • 86S

+ 1.4

13

1n =

= .816

In* C5n/8n* ) --:,

1.r.

r !J..o

.7 (cu.1:rent dolla:rs)
17 d.f,.

r

13 d.f.

r = .785

a

.961
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APPENDIX II
Manufaturers
AC'l'Un.BHS • sales

and

Year

Sales

1946
1949
1950

$17.6 (billion)
16.4
11.s
19.3
16.7
22.3
21.4
22.s
23.4
24.S
24.4
23.,S
23.8
26.3
24.s
27.7
27.9
28.4
29.9
26.2
27.8

1951

1952
1953
1954
19S5

19S6
1957

19S8
1959

investment

current

Anticipated Sales

29.6

dollars

Plant and Equipment
$8.3 (billion>
7.2
8.2
11.1

12.0
12,3
11.0
111114

1s.o

16.• 0
11.4
12.1

28.6

Ant,.

7o2

6.7
lla9
12.1

12.0
11.4
10.1

1s.o
16.4
13o2

12.3

Source:" Survey of Current Business, 11
1949-1960

APPENDIX III
Pn.ICB INDICBS

Year

h'ho.tesale: all
commercial e~

eluding food.
(1954

1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953

Producers' Durable
Bqui1'DN!nt.

= 100)

19S4

90.3
88.S
91.1
101.2
98.9
99.6
100.0

195S

102.,2

1Q2.6

1956

106.7
109.7

109.0
115.8

1957

Sources:

Adapted from data
in se-,tember, 19S8
"Survey."

83.1
87..0

89.o
96.8
97.S
99o0

100.0

U.S. lttCOl'lle

Output,
P• 221.

and

1958,

P&B
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FIRST REGRESSIONS IN AN OC ECONOMICS HONORS THESIS?
James G. Scoville, A.B. mcl 1961, A.M., Ph.D.

January 8, 2016

To the best of my knowledge, the attached senior honors thesis, Sales and Investment: Behavior of
Manufacturers, 1949-57, represents the first use of regression analysis in such papers. If it was the first,
its story is more than a little odd and unusual. I shared some of this with Hirsch Kasper who suggested I
write it up to accompany my personal copy of the thesis to some resting place in the Library.
The summer after my junior year, I worked in the Business Structures Division of the US Department of
Commerce. My duties focused on the quarterly Survey of Plant and Equipment Expenditures, especially
the most boring and mundane: verifying the handwritten entries on master sheets for each company
against the original paper surveys and entering numbers for purchases of used equipment which had
not been recorded before. There was a roomful of career clericals doing the same thing and I
inadvertently became a "ratebuster," since I wasn't used to pacing myself as they were. Some hostility
surfaced, but I got the message and spent hours watching the fish in the "National Aquarium," which
was in the basement of the Commerce building.
At some point, my job got enriched and I was asked to do a regression or two and given a sheet of paper
entitled "Simplex method for one or two variables." This I copied on a sheet of Thermofax paper (if you
know that stuff, you are definitely old enough to be reading this), which I took to Oberlin with me in the
fall. The data for the regressions came from the Survey of Current Business and other government
publications.
Armed with data and Thermofaxed instructions, I was ready for the next step, actually doing the
regressions. The College did not have (at least available to students) either of the then popular
mechanical calculating machines {Frieden or Marchant). The pinnacle of quantitative sophistication was
located in the Government Department where answers to survey questions could be entered on large
sheets of paper with holes corresponding to potentially interesting "cuts" of the sample (e.g., by
gender), the sheets placed in a box with corresponding holes so that when a dowel was inserted through
the box, you could simply lift out all the sheets corresponding to a variable of interest (e.g., females).
This was of no use to me: regression was the way. Thus, I calculated the various cross-products on a
slide rule (see parenthetical comment above on Thermofax paper}, added them up with paper and
pencil, and back to the slide rule for division problems. The rest, as they tritely say, is history.
But there's a little more that needs to be said: on page 11 a singularly awful sentence has been
underlined and awarded the epithet "woolly" by my dad, Orlin J. Scoville. "Joe" Scoville also earned a
Ph. D. in economics at Harvard. So far as I know, he and I are the only father-son pairing to share a
committee member, John T. Dunlop.
In 1960, there were (I think) ten of us in the honors seminar. You wrote the paper during fall semester
and then presented it in the spring. Ken Roose was my advisor; I ran into him in the lobby of Carnegie
shortly before Christmas break and asked if he wanted to see the paper before I turned it in. He said it
would be customary or conventional, I don't remember which. Finally, it is interesting that the 1956
edition of Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (which I have used all my life) does not contain the
statistical definition of "regression"! I guess my thesis was really ahead of its time.

